The “new” one—and the one likely to capture the attention of the retirement plan community over the next several weeks—deals with investment advice for participants (see “DoL Proposes New Advice Rule”
).
At a high level, the DoL has taken a major step back from the position it took in the final regulations on the subject put together—by the DoL—in 2008 before being halted, and then withdrawn last November by the new Administration (see “IMHO: Executive Order”
). They also, IMHO, seem to have taken a step back from the admonitions of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) to draft regulations that would craft an exemption to ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules that have long barred the ability to be compensated for advice on a basis that might vary according to the recommendations of the adviser1.
Withdrawal “Symptoms”
Now, many (including, apparently, some that signed that legislation) have always had an issue (to put it mildly) with this particular provision of the PPA, which they fear opens the door to “conflicted” advice (see “IMHO: Irreconcilable Differences”
). Of course, proponents of the PPA’s interpretation have argued that part of the DoL’s charge was to build compliance and disclosure structures that would prevent that result. However, that apparently wasn’t possible—at least for the current DoL, which, after halting the publication of the rules and putting it back out for comment, decided last fall to withdraw its proposal “in response to concerns raised in public comment letters questioning the adequacy of the final class exemption's conditions to mitigate the potential for investment adviser self-dealing2.”
Let me be clear: I’m not faulting the DoL for essentially adopting the position that the solution that they had crafted under the leadership of one Administration was not workable under another. Greed is a corrupting force, and even the most able, honest, and forthright adviser could, on any given day, be tempted to offer advice that better fits his or her own needs than that of a participant (we also know that there are plenty of advisers out there who are neither able, honest, nor forthright). Let’s face it—the folks most in need of investment advice are most assuredly also the least likely to read (or to understand) the disclosures that are supposed to put them on notice that the advice they are about to receive could be tainted (note that, even with those opportunities muted by the new regulations, the proposed disclosure form runs FIVE pages). In large part, IMHO, requiring that compensation for investment advice be “level”—as the newly proposed regulations do—is no more than a return to the status quo.
That, of course, is also its limitation. After all, while the new regulations were touted as a means of “increasing access” to “high quality investment advice,” I think it’s fair to say that the practical result is an emphasis on “high quality” (read “not from a source whose compensation varies according to the advice provided”) rather than “access,” because I’m hard-pressed to see how the new regulations will do much to engender a real expansion of advice offerings3.
1“A final rule and related class exemption published in January 2009 were withdrawn in November 2010 in response to concerns raised in public comment letters questioning the adequacy of the final class exemption's conditions to mitigate the potential for investment adviser self-dealing.”
2 Not to be cynical about it, but those concerns were expressed by just 28 individuals/institutions (which the DoL has published at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/cmt-investmentadvicefinalrule.html
). More accurately, there weren’t (even) 28 expressions of concern about the regulations themselves. Many, as you might suspect, were simply pointing out areas of needed clarification; several were just pointing out the need for final regulations, noting that the lack of certainty about the rules had created a legislative limbo in which nobody was doing anything, or at least anything different, regarding the provision of investment advice. That said, apparently somewhere in that relatively modest number of comments lay arguments compelling enough to persuade the Labor Department that there was no way to thread that particular needle.
3 The DoL would presumably take issue with my conclusion, since the regulations repeat the assumption associated with the prior—but very different—version that this approach would “extend investment advice to 21 million previously unadvised participants and beneficiaries.”