IMHO: Irreconcilable Differences
Aug 25, 2008
(PLANSPONSOR.com) --
Last week, the Department of Labor took another step
toward finishing another piece of unfinished business when it
proposed regulations necessary to implement (in confidence,
anyway) the provisions of the Pension Protection Act (PPA)
dealing with investment advice offered to participants under
the auspices of a fiduciary adviser.
For the most part, the proposals (see "
EBSA Clarifies Investment Advice Regulations
") seem fairly unobtrusive—if not downright "squishy"
(more on that in another column).
And, like the recent proposals on fee disclosure (see "
IMHO: No One (Else) To Blame
"), most of the 129-page document is spent outlining the
details of the proposal's cost/benefit analysis ($10
billion, in case you were wondering—$14 billion in benefits
versus $4 billion in implementation/compliance costs).
So, if you were having trouble working up the courage to
wade through the PDF, take heart—the meat is found in the
first 35 pages (with the occasional reference to a glossary
at the back).
I was about halfway through the document (yes, the whole
thing), when the response from Congressman George Miller
(D-California) hit my inbox.
Now, I wasn't surprised to find that Miller, Chairman of
the House Education and Labor Committee, took issue with
the proposal; it's an election year, after all.
But Miller didn't just criticize the proposal, or say that
it didn't go far enough, as he has on issues like fee
disclosure (see "
Miller Fee Bill Cruises through House Committee
" at ).
No, he called the proposal "nothing less than a boon for
Wall Street and corporate executives" and urged the DoL to
"immediately withdraw these harmful proposals."
And then he took a final swipe, noting that, "[i]n its
final months in office, this administration has developed a
disgraceful pattern of sneaking in last-minute regulatory
changes at the behest of special interests" (see "
Miller Slams DoL Advice Proposal
").
Setting aside for a moment the contents of the proposal,
it's not like the DoL just rolled out of bed and decided to
create some guidelines for investment advice.
The PPA set out a lot of new rules and plan design
opportunities and then—prudently, IMHO—left fleshing out
the details on things like participant notices and, yes,
fiduciary adviser investment advice to the ministrations of
the Department of Labor.
Legislation that, admittedly, is now two years old—but one
can hardly argue credibly that the DoL hasn't been kept
busy trying to fulfill the "to do" list created by the
PPA.
The reality is that the investment advice provisions of
the PPA were among its most controversial —that they made
the final cut of that legislation was something of a
miracle or mistake, depending on your perspective; that the
areas of gray left were so abundant perhaps an implicit
acknowledgement of the inability of the legislative process
to balance two very opposite views.
Doubtless there were (are?) those who hoped those
provisions would simply atrophy on the vine for want of
attention.
Of course, the heart of the controversy lies in the
potential, if not inherent, conflicts of interest that
arise when advisers offer advice on investments that
provide compensation to those same advisers.
Some, of course, believe that those conflicts can never be
surmounted, or at least that they cannot be surmounted by
every adviser every time.
Others believe that the problem can be overcome by a
combination of process structure, disclosure, and
oversight.
Whether or not the PPA's broad outline—or last week's
DoL proposal—is sufficient to provide the latter will
remain a point of debate, IMHO—except for those who will
never reconcile themselves to the notion.
Nevin E. Adams